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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The district court did not err in its summary judgment ruling.
The relevant deed language is unambiguous. Jack Cridlebaugh sold "all of his interest,"
in the property now owned by John and Carol Hoch, to the Hochs. He expressly included in that
general grant easement rights he had reserved in earlier conveyances to Rob and Becky Vance
and Jake and Audrey Sweet. The easement rights he reserved were rights to ingress and egress
over routes providing access to the Vances' property and the Sweets' property from a public
right-of-way, as well as all other roads existing on the several properties at the time of
conveyance.

The language of Cridlebaugh's reservations and subsequent conveyance is

unambiguous.
The easements reserved by Cridlebaugh and subsequently transferred to Hochs were
appurtenant easements. First, the law presumes the easements to be appurtenant. Second, the
nature of these easements is appurtenant-the easements benefit the dominant estate by
providing a means of ingress and egress.
Hochs ask that the Court affirm the district court

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Hochs dispute Vances' description of the breadth of the district court's smnmary
judgment ruling.

The sole issue decided at summary judgment was that Hochs held an

appurtenant easement over the upper road. The court interpreted the relevant provisions of the
transfer instruments and found the easement over the upper road properly reserved by specific
reservation language and a catch-all provision. The summary judgment decision reserved all
other issues, without limitation, for determination at trial.
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Hochs agree with the Vances' description of the Course of Proceedings.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Vances' description of facts relies upon findings issued by the trial court.

The trial

court's findings of fact were issued over two years after the grant of summary judgment and are
the product of the court's review of the evidence and argument submitted during the trial on this
matter. Vances, however, have not argued on appeal any error on the part of the trial court. Nor
have Vances challenged any of the factual findings of the district court in its summary judgment
ruling. Therefore, while many of the findings made by the trial court are identical to those
established at the summary judgment hearing, 1 this Court should confine its review of the district
court's grant of summary judgment to those facts before it at the time of summary judgment.
The following facts were established at summary judgment:
Jack Cridlebaugh was the owner of 90 acres of real property in the Waha region of
fdaho.2 Jn 2000, Cridlebaugh subdivided the property into several parcels. 3 Three of the parcels
were sold over the course of three years: Rob and Becky Vance purchased 20 acres on October
12, 2000, Jake and Audrey Sweet purchased 40 acres on October 10, 2001, and John and Carole
Hoch purchased 20 acres on March 26, 2002 (hereinafter referred to, respectively, as "Vance
property", "Sweet property'', and "Hoch property").

1

4

Cridlebaugh made each of these

One notable exception is that Hochs dispute the trial court's finding that the Hoehs did not
believe they had acquired an easement over the upper road at the time of conveyance. R. Vol. lI,
~· 388-89.
~ R. Vol. II, p. 290.
3
Id.
4 Id.
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conveyances by warranty deed (hereinafter referred to, respectively, as "Vance Deed", "Sweet
Deed", and "Hoch Deed"). 5 Cridlebaugh retained ownership of the remaining 10 acres.

6

,7

In conveying the three parcels, Cridlebaugh granted and reserved several easements over
each piece of property. Before proceeding to the language of those easements, it is important the
Court understand the roads existing on the property. At all relevant times, the Vance property,
the Sweet property and the Hoch property have all been accessible by two access easements,
known as the upper road and the lower road. 8 The upper road and the lower road run from
Stagecoach Road, a public right-of-way to the Vance property, Sweet property, and Hoch
property. 9 On Exhibit 8 of the Clerk's Record ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5"), Stagecoach Road can
be seen running in a northerly direction on the bottom right-hand corner of the exhibit, thence in
a northwesterly direction to the middle of the top edge of the exhibit. Though "upper road" and
"lower road" were, at one point, descriptive terms, they have become proper nouns for purposes
of this litigation. The lower road intersects with Stagecoach Road near the top of the exhibit and
runs to the west. There is no dispute regarding the lower road.
The upper road intersects Stagecoach Road at two points. The upper road runs westerly
from an intersection point on the bottom right-hand corner of Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5, through the
parcel labeled "Houghton", through the parcel labeled "Weinert", through the ten acres retained
by Cridlebaugh, through the Sweet property, across a corner of the Vance Property and to the

s Id.
Id.
Though much of the detail found in the aerial photographs has been degraded upon
photocopying, the Court may be assisted by a review of the aerial photograph used as an
illustrative exhibit, found at R. Exh. 3 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1"), and the aerial photograph with a
parcel overlay, found at R. Exh. 8 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5").
8
R. Vol. II, p. 291.
9
Id.
6
7
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Hoch property. 10 The upper road then comes back in an easterly direction through the Vance
property, through the parcel labeled "McKenna" and intersects with Stagecoach Road at an
intersection point on the top-middle of Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5. 11 Thus, the upper road makes a
loop through the properties. 12 The northern half of that loop (that portion running west from the
Hoch property to Stagecoach Road) is what has been referred to by the paiiies as "Buckboard
Lane."

13

The pa11ies

that Cridlebaugh held an easement over the entire upper road except

that portion traversing the McKenna property.
In the Hoch Deed,

14

Cridlebaugh conveyed "all of his interest" in the Hoch prope11y,

SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth
in the following easements:

* **

5)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and
and rights incidental
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument
No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [Vance Deed]
6)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument
No. 668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [Sweet Deed]

***
Thus, the Hoch Deed incorporates by reference the easements reserved in the Vance Deed and
the Sweet Deed. The language of the easement reservation made by Cridlebaugh in the Vance
Decd

15

and Sweet Deed 16 is identical:
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for
ingress and
running from the public right of way to the above described
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement

10

Compare R. Vol. II, p. 292 with R. Exh. 8 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5").

II

Id.

p
~
13
14

R. Vol. II, p. 292

Id.

R. Exh. No. 39 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #107").
R. Exh. No. 37 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #105").
16
R. Exh. No. 38 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #106").

15
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over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being
conveyed.
At the summary judgment hearing, the parties agreed that by this language Cridlebaugh reserved,
at very least, an easement over the upper road from his retained property to the Hoch property.

17

The issue before the district court on summary judgment was whether the Hoch Deed
effected the transfer from Cridlebaugh to Hochs of an appurtenant easement for ingress and
egress across the upper road. The district court found that it did.

ARGUMENT
The district court did not err in its summary judgment ruling that the Hoch Deed
unambiguously transferred an access easement to the Hoch property over the upper road. The
district court found that Cridlebaugh reserved an easement for ingress and egress over the upper
road with a specific reservation over that roadway, followed by a general catch-all reservation
over all roadways existing at the time of his reservation. R. Vol. II, p. 295. The district court
ruled that Cridlcbaugh then transferred that easement right to Hochs when he deeded them "all of
his interest" in the Hoch property, explicitly including his reservation across the upper road and
all roadways. Id.
Vances challenge the district court's finding that the language reserving the easement is
unambiguous and the district court's interpretation of the nature of the easements reserved by
Crid lebaugh. Vances ask this Court to hold the relevant language of the transfer instrument
ambiguous, despite the instrument's use of historic, common and customary language in the
practice of real property transfers. Vances invite the Court to speculate as to how Cridlebaugh
may have intended common language to hold a different meaning.

17

R. Vol. II, p. 292.
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Vances provide no

explanation for how the plain language of Cridlebaugh' s reservation could be interpreted in any
manner other than to effoct a reservation of an easement right across the access roads to the
property as well as all roads existing on the property at the time of reservation. Thus, Vances fail
to set forth a reasonable interpretation of the Hoch deed that is alternative to that found by the
district court. Therefore, the Court should deny Vances' request for reversal on the issue of
ambiguity. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003).
Vances challenge the district court's holding that Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant
easement over the upper road, and challenge the district court's finding that Cridlebaugh also
reserved an easement over all roads existing on the property at the time of reservation. Vances
argue that the easement reservation created in gross easements rather than appurtenant
easements. To prevail on this argument, Vances must overcome the presumption that easements
are appurtenant. See Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). Vances
attempt to support their argument, not by challenging the appurtenant nature of the upper road,
but by challenging the appurtenant nature of Buckboard Lane-a road over which the Hochs
were adjudicated to hold an easement right at the subsequent trial. Vances claim that because
Cridlebaugh could not provide Hochs with legal access over Buckboard Lane all the way to a
public right-of-way,

18

the route cannot be held to benefit the dominant estate. Vances fail to

provide any legal authority supporting the proposition that an easement for ingress and egress
only benefits the dominant estate when it runs all the way to a public right-of-way. Therefore,
Vances have failed to present an alternative reasonable interpretation to the language of the Hoch
Deed. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
18

As recognized by the trial court, Cridlebaugh could not provide I-lochs with an easement over
the entirety of Buckboard Lane, only that part of the road which existed on his property at the
time of the Vance Deed.
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A.

STANDARD OFREVIE\V

The district court granted summary judgment in favor ofHochs "as to the existence of an
appurtenant easement on the upper road." R. Vol. ll, p. 297. The court based its judgment, in
part, on findings that (1) the relevant transfer instruments were unambiguous with regard to the
easement; and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of the
upper road at all relevant times. "The standard of review on appeal from an order granting
summary judgment is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion
for summary judgment." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 770, 133 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006).
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery
documents before the court show that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the requested
judgment. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267
(2000). The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. Here, Hochs requested the district court
find that Hochs held an appurtenant easement over the upper road by way of the deed from
Cridlebaugh.

In support of their motion, Hochs offered (1) the transfor instruments from

Cridlebaugh to Vances, Sweets. and Hochs; (2) Cridlebaugh's deposition testimony regarding
the state of his property prior to any of the transfers; and (3) an aerial photograph of the property.
In opposing Hochs' motion, the Vances could "not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of [their] pleadings." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). Once the moving party has shown the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish
an issue of fact regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923
P.2d 416 (1996). The Vances were required to respond "by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in [Rule 56], ... set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
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Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Vances offered additional excerpts from the Cridlebaugh deposition
and an affidavit of Becky Vance. The district court also had before it an affidavit of Jake Sweet.
By these documents, as well as the pleadings on record, Vances sought to show a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether the Hochs held an appurtenant easement over the upper road.
However, "[c ]reating only a slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment
motion; a summary judgment will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the
cou1i a directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as
to the facts." Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795
(1984).
Therefore, this Comi must determine whether the trial court erred in finding, based upon
the record provided to it by the parties, that reasonable minds could not disagree as to those facts
material to a determination on the question of whether Hochs' held an appurtenant easement over
the upper road.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE TRANSFER
INSTRUMENT UNAMBIGUOUS.

The Corni begins the interpretation and construction of a deed by first detennining
whether the document is ambiguous. See Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 697,
827 P.2d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 1992). The answer to this threshold inquiry dictates the proper
scope of the Court's inquiry into the pa1iies' intent. Id. "If the instrument is unambiguous, its
terms are settled as a matter of law using the plain language of the document." Read v. Harvey,
141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005).

"Interpretation of an ambiguous deed is a

question of fact to be settled by the language in the conveyance instrument and the facts and
circumstances of the transaction."

Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. "Whether a
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contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393,
396 (2007).
"Ambiguity exists only if language of the conveyance instrument is subject to conflicting
interpretations." Neider, 138 ldaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. Those conflicting interpretations
must be reasonable. See Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983).
Here, the relevant text includes the Hoch Deed as well as incorporated portions of the Vance
Deed and the Sweet Deed.
In the Hoch Deed, Cridlebaugh transferred to Hochs "all interest in the ... described
premises" "TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in the following
easements:"
5)
Easement for purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Vance Deed].
6)
Easement for purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Sweet Deed].
R. Exh. No. 39 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #107").
unambiguous:

The language of the conveyance instrument is

Cridlebaugh transferred to Hochs the premises together with the ingress and

egress easements he reserved for himself in the Vance Deed and the Sweet Deed. The Vance
Deed and the Sweet Deed contain the following easement reservation:
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for
ingress and egress running from the public right-of-way to the above described
real property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein
being conveyed.
R. Exh. No. 37 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #105") & R. Exh. No. 38 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #106"). The
language of this reservation is unambiguous: Cridlebaugh made a specific easement reservation
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over those roads which ran from the public right-of-way to the Vance and Sweet properties, and
then made a general reservation over all roadways existing on the Vance and Sweet properties at
the time of conveyance.
Vances ask the Court to find ambiguity based upon (1) use of the term "roadways" in the
Vance Deed and Sweet Deed; and (2) use of "easement" in the singular in the Hoch Deed. App.

Br. 16-17.
( 1)

Vances argue that ambiguity exists because "[i]t is impossible to determine what

'roadways' the grantor was trying to convey an easement across from the documents
themselves." App. Br. 16. The language of the instruments belies this argument; Cridlebaugh
reserved and easement over "all roadways" existing at the time of transfer.

There is no

reasonable basis for interpreting this language to mean that Cridlebaugh only intended to reserve
an easement over certain roadways and was disclaiming any easement over other roadways.
Vances base the entirety of their argument upon a factual dispute regarding what roadways were
in existence at the relevant time. A factual dispute as to the existence of a roadway does not
render ambiguous Cridlebaugh's reservation of an easement across routes providing access to a
public right of way, together with any existing roadway.
(2)

Vances argue ambiguity exists because Cridlebaugh reserved "all easements for

ingress and egress ... together with an easement over and across all roadways" in the Vance
Deed and Sweet Deed, but transferred to Hochs only the "easement" reserved in the respective
deeds. App. Br. 17-18. Based on this language, Vances contend that an alternative reasonable
interpretation of the deed from Cridlebaugh to Hoch is that Cridlebaugh only intended to give an
easement over a single road, not all roadways. Id. This argument is unpersuasive. An easement
is a description of a property right, not a description of the property. See, e.g., Backman v.
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Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554
P.2d 948, 951 (1976). Thus, Cridlebaugh could rightly reserve an easement over all roadways
providing access to a public right-of-way and all other roadways existing at the time of
conveyance. He could (and did) then transfer that easement right to the Hochs. There exists no
foundation in the Hoch Deed or the incorporated provisions of the Vance Deed and Sweet Deed
supporting an interpretation that Cridlebaugh intended to transfer Hochs anything less than the
entirety of the easement right he reserved in the Vance Deed and Sweet Deed.
Vances have confined their challenge to the district court's grant at summary judgment.
The question at the summary judgment proceeding was whether the relevant text was ambiguous
in its application to the upper road. Prior to the grant of summary judgment, the district court
was presented with the following facts:
(a)

the upper road existed at all relevant times, 1 R. Vol. II, p. 291-92;

(b)

the upper road provided a route for ingress and egress running from Stagecoach
Road, a public right-of-way, through the property retained by Cridlebaugh,
through the Sweet property, through the Vance property, and to the Hoch
property, R. Vol. If, p. 291-92;

(c)

Cridlebaugh reserved an easement over the upper road running from his retained
property to the Hoch property, R. Vol. II, p. 292, L 17-20; and

(d)

Cridlebaugh transferred his interest in the Hoch property to the Hochs by means
of the Hoch Deed, R. Vol. II, p. 291.

--·--····--------

19

Vances (and Sweets) disputed the nature and existence of the upper road at summary
judgment. After a review of the admissible evidence submitted by the parties, the district court
ruled that reasonable minds could not disagree as to the fact that the upper road was in existence
at all relevant times. See R. Vol. II, p. 294. Vances' Opening Brief does not challenge the
district court's finding.

-11-

Those undisputed faets compelled the court's finding that Hochs held an easement over the upper
road. Cridlebaugh retained an easement for ingress and egress in his transfers to V ances and
Sweets. In so doing, Cridlebaugh reserved access to the Hoch prope1ty over the upper road.
Cridlebaugh transferred the entirety of his interest to the Hochs, expressly including the retained
easement. Therefore, Hochs obtained an easement over the upper road.
Vances ask the Court to read ambiguity into transfer
common and customary use in the transfer of real prope1ty.

that is of a historic,
Rather than offer a reasonable

alternative interpretation to the plain language of the text, Vances invite the Court to speculate as
to ways in which the grantor may have misunderstood the effect of the deed. Vances' argument
finds no support in the established principles interpreting real property instruments. Transfers in
real prope1ty are made by instruments in writing. Idaho Code § 9-505 & § 55-601. As a general
rule, the Courts assume that the parties mean exactly what they wrote. Phillips, 121 Idaho at
697, 827 P.2d at 710. That principle renders instruments reliable to both third parties, as well as
to the grantor and grantee.

If the language challenged here renders a transfer instrument

ambiguous, the parol evidence rule will be relegated to the exception rather than the rule. See id.
The Court should, therefore, limit inquiry regarding the parties' intent to the four comers of the
deed.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE EASEMENTS
RESERVED BY CRIDLEBAUGH WERE APPURTENANT EASEMENTS.

Vances argue that the Court erred (1) by not confining the nature of the easement held by
Hochs across the upper road to existing for the purpose of ingress and egress, App. Br. 13; and
(2) by ruling that Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant easement rather than an easement in
gross, App. Br. 14. The district court did not err on either count. First, the limitation of Hochs'

12-

easement to being for the purposes of ingress and egress has never been in dispute. Second, the
manner of creation of the easement over the upper road and the purpose

that easement

establish its nature as an appurtenant easement. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974.
Vances first ask this Court to reverse the grant of summary judgment because the district
court did not limit the Hochs' easement over the upper road to
request for relief on this point is perplexing because (1) the language

and

Vances

the summary judgment

ruling makes clear the district court considered Hochs' easement to be for the purposes of ingress
and cgress, 20 and in any event, the district comi expressly reserved ruling on the scope of the
easement for trial, R. Vol. II, p. 297; (2) Hochs have never claimed that the easement on the
upper road is for anything other than ingress and egress; and (3) the judgment limits the scope of
Hochs' easement over the upper road to ingress and egress, R. Vol. II, p. 412. lfochs have never
disputed--and do not now dispute-that limitation.
Vances next claim that the district court erred in ruling that Cridlebaugh reserved an
appurtenant easement. "There are two general types of easements: easements appurtenant and
easements in gross. An appurtenant easement is a right to use a certain parcel, the servient
estate, for the benefit of another parcel, the dominant estate." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76
P.3d at 974. "In contrast, an easement in

benefits the holder of the easement personally,

without connection to the ownership or use of a specific parcel of land." Id. "Where the owner
of the dominant estate is selling the property to be subjected to the servitude, an express
easement may be created by reservation or by exception." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence,

20

The district court concluded "that the upper road easement Mr. Cridlebaugh created and
reserved for himself and his heirs and assigns was conveyed to the I-lochs ... where he conveyed
ingress and
easement that he had reserved in the Sweet deed," R. Vol. II, p. 295.
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143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007). Cridlebaugh created the easements he held over
the Vance and Sweet properties by reservation:
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for
and egress running from the public right-of-way to the above described
real property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein
being conveyed.
The district court found that by this reservation Mr. Cridlebaugh created an access easement over
the upper road. "He then reserved to himself, his heirs and assigns all existing easements, of
which [the access easement] was one." R. Vol. IL p.
There exists no particular form or words necessary for the creation of an appurtenant
easement. See Tower Asset, 143 Idaho at 714, 152 P.3d at 585. "[WJhether an easement is
apputienant or in gross is to be determined by a fair interpretation of the grant or reservation
creating the easement, aided, if necessary, by the situation of the property and the surrounding
circumstances." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 10 (footnote omitted). "In cases of
doubt, Idaho courts presume the easement is appurtenant." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d
at 974.

Here, both the language and the surrounding circumstances support a finding that

Cridlebaugh's reservation of an easement over the upper road was an appurtenant easement.
The language of the reservation supports a finding that Cridlebaugh created an
appurtenant easement. Cridlebaugh not only reserved an easement for himself, as granter, but
also for "his heirs and assigns".

A reservation in favor of the grantor's heirs and assigns

demonstrates the appm1enant nature of the easement because the phrase '"generally
comprehends all those who take either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor,
whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of law."' Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 111
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Idaho 370, 375, 723 P.2d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 109 (5th ed.
1979)).
The nature of the easement also supports a finding that the easement over the upper road
is appurtenant to the Hoch property. As set forth above, the district court found that reasonable
minds could not disagree as to the fact that the upper road was a route for ingress and egress
from Stagecoach Road to the Hoch property. A route for access to a public right-of-way is a
benefit to the Hoch property. See also Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884
(2008); Hadfield v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 566, 388 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1963); Vil!. of

Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908). As the district court noted, "[i]t cannot be
gainsaid that access to one's property enhances one's ability to use it." R. Vol. II, p. 296.
Vances attack the district court's finding that the easement over the upper road 1s
appurtenant by questioning the value of an easement right adjudicated at trial: the easement right
over Buckboard Lane. App. Br. 14. Though Buckboard Lane runs from the Hoch property to
Stagecoach Road, part of the route crosses over onto property owned by a third party, McKenna.
Cridlebaugh never owned the McKenna property, and he did not hold an easement right over that
portion of Buckboard Lane which runs through the McKenna property. Vances argue on appeal
that because Cridlebaugh could not transfer an easement right on Buckboard Lane all the way to
a public right-of-way, the Buckboard Lane easement is not a benefit to the Hoch property.
Vances argument fails for two reasons. First, the district court did not rule upon Hochs' right to
Buckboard Lane in its summary judgment. The sole issue upon which summary judgment was
granted was that the Hochs held an appurtenant easement along the upper road from Stagecoach
Road to the Hoch property. R. Vol. II, p. 297; see also R. Exh. 41 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #109"), p.
46. II. 12-17 (transcript of hearing on a Motion to Show Cause, held six months after grant of
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summary judgment, at which the district court reiterated the scope of its summary judgment
grant). The inclusion of Buckboard Lane as a route over which Hochs held an appurtenant
easement was not adjudicated until trial. R. Vol. IT, p. 412-13. Vances have not challenged the
trial court's finding of an easement over Buckboard Lane in their Appellants' Brief. 21 Second,
the Vances fail to provide any authority for the proposition that an easement for ingress and
egress is of no value to the dominant estate unless it provides access all the way to a public rightof-way at the time of granting. "The failure to support an alleged error with argument and
authority is deemed a waiver of the issue." Lewiston lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston,
151Idaho800, 808, 264 P.3d 907, 915 (2011).
Vances failed to present evidence rebutting the presumption that the easement rights
reserved by Cridlebaugh were appurtenant to the Hoch property. The nature of the easement
over the upper road and the language used in its creation supp011 a finding that the easement over
the upper road was appurtenant to the property purchased by the Hochs. Therefore, the district
court did not err in ruling that Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant easement over the upper
road.

By purchasing the dominant

the Hochs obtained the easement. See 81 Am.

Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009) ("An appurtenant easement for right of way purposes passes
with subsequent conveyances, even if the specific language of the right of way is not repeated in
the deed."); see also Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 13, 156 P.3d 502,
514 (2007); Bothwell v. Keefer, 53 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65, 66 (1933). Therefore, the Hochs
acquired the easements reserved by Cridlebaugh in the Vance Deed and Sweet Deed.

21

At trial, testimony was provided regarding the particular benefits holding an easement across
Buckboard Lane would be to the Hoch property. Hoch testified to the benefit of his easement
over Buckboard Lane both as an access route to Stagecoach Road and for ingress and egress
even absent the ability to reach Stagecoach Road.
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CONCLUSION
Hochs ask this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DA TED this 15th day of January, 2013.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

Attorneys for Respondents
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